Welcome to my research page.
I am a Ph.D. candidate at the University of Notre Dame, specializing in early modern European philosophy, with a focus on the interplay between metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind. My dissertation, titled “Spinoza on Parallelism and the Ontology of Thought,” investigates the compatibility of Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism with various challenging ideas. My work also explores the metaphysical commitments of rationalist philosophers like Descartes and Spinoza, examining how these shape their views on the mind-body relationship, theories of representation, and concepts of truth and falsity. Below, you will find summaries of my current research projects.
Project 1: Descartes’s Theory of Representation and Scholastic Inheritance
Overview
This project investigates Descartes’s theory of representation, focusing on how his inheritance of the scholastic distinction between formal and objective beings shaped his theory and contributed to his broader metaphysical and epistemological framework.
Abstract of Resulting Paper: “Descartes on Materially False Ideas and Their Objective Reality”
In the Third Meditation, Descartes introduces a special kind of idea that represents non-things as things. These ideas, known as materially false ideas (MFIs), present several challenges to Descartes's general theory of ideas. This paper identifies three problematic tendencies in current interpretations of MFIs and proposes a new interpretation that avoids all of them. According to this new interpretation, MFIs are ideas that represent things that cannot exist in reality. They are formed through a complex cognitive process in which incompatible ideas are combined. These ideas are false not because they misrepresent their objects by representing other objects but because they fail to sufficiently represent their objects as they are. Building on this new interpretation, the paper will argue against a widely accepted view among commentators that MFIs lack objective reality. It will demonstrate that the existence of MFIs does not contradict Descartes's general theory of ideas.
Project 2: Spinoza on Parallelism and the Ontology of Thought
Overview
My dissertation project focuses on Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism and its compatibility with various challenging ideas. Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism posits a one-to-one correspondence between the mental and physical realms, yet certain types of ideas appear to challenge this framework. These include inadequate ideas of ideas, false ideas, beings of reason, and the idea of God. Through a detailed examination of Spinoza’s theories of distinctions and representation, I argue for the coherence of his parallelism doctrine with these problematic ideas, shedding new light on his ontology of thought. This research aims to enhance our understanding of Spinoza’s metaphysical and epistemological frameworks.
Abstract of Resulting Paper 1: “‘Conceive One Without the Other’: Spinoza on Real Distinction”
In the context of Spinoza’s monism, commentators have long struggled to explain why Spinoza considers the distinction between different attributes of the only divine substance as a real distinction (E1p10s). In this paper, I argue that the difficulty arises from a general misunderstanding of Spinoza’s concept of real distinction. Despite their apparent similarity, Spinoza’s understanding of real distinction differs significantly from that of his predecessors, particularly Descartes. The difference becomes most evident in Spinoza’s interpretation of the criterion for real distinction, which he inherited from Descartes: “Two things are really distinct if one can be conceived without the other, and vice versa.” Descartes understands this criterion to mean that two things are really distinct from each other if, even though the concept of one does not involve the concept of the other positively, it does involve the concept of the other negatively. On the other hand, Spinoza interprets the criterion as stating that one thing is really distinct from another if the concept of one does not include the concept of the other, whether positively or negatively. This new understanding of real distinction has significant implications. Firstly, it breaks the traditional link between real distinction and separability between relata. Secondly, it allows for real distinction to even be compatible with numerical identity. As a result, this new understanding of real distinction not only helps explain why Spinoza considers the distinction between different attributes of the only substance as a real distinction but also helps clarify the relationship between parallel modes under different attributes.
Abstract of Resulting Paper 2: “Finite Subject Experiencing the World: The Compatibility Between Spinoza’s Parallelism and the Existence of Errors”
This paper addresses the tension in Spinoza’s philosophy between his doctrine of parallelism and the occurrence of errors in human cognition. While Spinoza posits that all ideas agree with their objects, implying truth, he also acknowledges human cognitive limitations and errors. The standard solution suggests separating parallelism from the criterion for true ideas, allowing for misrepresentation. Challenging this solution, I argue for the inseparability of Spinoza’s doctrine of parallelism from his criterion for true ideas. However, this does not imply the impossibility of error. Contrary to what commentators commonly assume, for Spinoza, error consists not in misrepresentation but in the limited nature of individual finite minds, particularly the restricted scope of the objects they can represent. This limitation leads to the finite mind’s perpetual occupation of a partial perspective regarding the world.